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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
conviction, even though the evidence supports the verdict, if the error committed
was substantial. Apologies exchanged between counsel after stormy arguments
and instructions by the court will not rectify the impression created in the minds
of the jury from such abhorrent proceedings.
L. H. S.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE TO PROVE PARTICULAR RELEVANT TRAITS ADmISSIBLE

In People v. McDowell, °a the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction of
second degree assault, affirmed by the Appellate Division,3°b on the erroneous
exclusion of evidence. The excluded evidence dealt with defendant's reputation
for peacefulness in the community in which he resided and the alleged hostility
of the complaining witness.
The exclusion of the evidence regarding the hostility of the witness was
clearly error, the New York rule being ". . . that the hostility of a witness
toward a party, against whom he is called, may be proved by any competent
evidence"3oc
The leading case in New York on the rules governing the admissibility of
character evidence is People v. Van Gaasbeck,31 in which the Court reached
three conclusions. First, character evidence is admissible to prove only relevant
traits, i.e., in a murder charge, evidence as to peacefulness is competent but
soberness would not be; second, the evidence as to the relevant traits is not
admissible if it is based on the witness' personal knowledge rather than his
knowledge of the defendant's reputation in the community; and third, negative
testimony is competent, i.e., having known him for thirty years and not having
heard anything contrary to a good character about him is admissible to give rise
to an inference of good reputation.
In Van Gaasbeck, two witnesses, who had known the defendant for twentyfive to thirty years, were called. The first was asked, "What do you say his
reputation is?" The objection was that there was no foundation and that it was
not the proper way to show character. The second was asked, "What do you say
of it?" Both questions were excluded upon objection. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals looked to the testimony immediately preceding the first question which
had established that the witness knew defendant's reputation for peacefulness.
This served to limit the question to a particular, relevant trait, in which case it
was proper. In view of the testimony of the second witness that he knew
defendant as being a peaceful, quiet man, the Court held the second question
properly excluded as probing not reputation but personal knowledge.
In the instant case, it appears that two of the questions properly excluded
were: "Are you familiar with his general reputation?" and "Do you know the
general reputation of the defendant?" These questions are too broad to be
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admissible under the test established in Van Gaasbeck. They require a proper
foundation, establishing that the testimony sought would pertain only to a
particular, relevant trait. Also properly excluded, on the grounds that it
pertained not to reputation but sought evidence as to prior acts which could
of
only be admissible if offered to show defendant's state of mind at the time 32
the alleged crime, was "Have you had any trouble with the defendant?"
Also excluded was the question, "Did you know defendant's reputation for
soberness, is it good or bad?" While the question may have been improper in
form, since it is necessary to establish knowledge of reputation before an opinion
can be elicited as to its nature, it probably should have been admitted along
with "Do you know his reputation for peacefulness?" It is clear that these
questions would have been33 admitted if they were in the form of "Did you hear
of" or "Have you heard."
It is clear, however, that evidence as to reputation of the defendant's
relevant character traits should be admitted and that its exclusion may
constitute reversible error. Therefore, it is submitted that when questions
pertaining to character and reputation are excluded, it would be good practice
for the trial judge to indicate exactly where the objection lies so that the
pertinent evidence may be admitted.
R.E.N.
EXPERT NEED NOT TESTIFY AS TO THE REASONS FOR HIS OPINION

The question presented in People v. Crossland3 4 is whether an expert
witness is required to state the reasons for his opinion on direct examination in
a prosecution for possession of policy slips. The Court of Appeals, unanimously
reversing the Appellate Division,3 5 held that a police officer, testifying as an
expert, is not required to explain the technical basis of his opinion as part of
the People's case.
The State produced one witness, a police officer, who testified that he had
observed defendant Crossland on a certain day receive a slip of paper and
money from defendant Davis, and that he had been able to retrieve the slip
of paper from the defendants. The slip of paper was introduced into evidence.
The officer, a qualified expert on policy slips, "then testified that in his opinion
the writings on the slip of paper represented 17 'plays' on mutuel race horse
policy." This constituted the People's case, and defendant Crossland was
convicted for possession of policy slips.
The Appellate Division reversed this conviction on the basis of People v.
Pierson,3 6 People v. Oak,37 and People v. Harris.38 In these cases convictions
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